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IS THERE A ROLE FOR FUNDING 






This paper tests the role of different banks’ liquidity funding structures in explaining the 
bank failures that occurred in the United States between 2007 and 2009. The results highlight 
that funding is indeed a significant factor in explaining banks’ probability of default. By 
confirming the role of funding as a driver of banking crisis, the paper also recognizes that the 
new liquidity framework proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision appears to 
have the features needed to strengthen banks’ liquidity conditions and improve financial 
stability. Its correct implementation, together with closer supervision of banks’ liquidity and 
funding conditions, appear decisive, however, if such improvements are to be achieved. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
1 
The financial crisis that shook the global financial system with such force continues to affect 
many dimensions of the financial landscape, from individual banks’ business strategy to 
sovereign stability, to the authorities’ policy response and regulatory reforms. 
 
One critical dimension of the crisis for many banks around the world has been the problem of 
funding liquidity. Very often, banks and non-bank financial institutions found themselves in 
the midst of the crisis with little or no access to the markets and unable to refinance their 
wholesale, short-term funding positions. Some institutions were severely hit by these funding 
shocks because of their heavy reliance on wholesale funding. Notable examples are some 
investment banks in the United States, who found themselves illiquid almost overnight; the 
Landesbanken in Germany; and several banks in the United Kingdom, as well as banks in 
countries like Australia which, despite their sound asset quality, faced major funding 
challenges owing to their extensive reliance on short-term wholesale funding.
2  
 
The policy response to these widespread funding weaknesses has come in the form of ample 
liquidity support measures by all of the most important central banks around the world, who 
have played the role of lenders of last resort. Since then, new regulations aimed at addressing 
the liquidity shortcomings faced by many banks during the crisis have been proposed or 
introduced. The new regulatory framework for liquidity risk approved by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) is the most notable reform in this direction.
3  
 
Against this background, the present study investigates the role of the different funding 
structures at bank-by-bank level to assess whether any significant weakness in the funding 
liquidity profile may have helped to drive banks towards more vulnerable situations and 
eventually to default.  
 
In particular, focusing on the defaults of US banks that have occurred in recent years the 
paper explores whether and to what extent different funding profiles might contribute to 
explaining bank failures. In other words, it aims to identify whether any specific funding 
structure can be considered a possible indicator of banks’ fragility and higher likelihood of 
default.  
 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Stijn Claessens, Francesco Columba, Sonali Das, Erlend Nier, Lev Ratnovski and Roberto 
Rinaldi for their valuable comments. Christine Stone provided excellent editorial assistance. The views 
expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Italy. 
2 See Viñals et al. (2010) for a discussion of the interbank and repo market weaknesses involved in the case of 
Lehman Brothers. Bologna et al. (2011) describe the problems with the German Landesbanken. See Bologna 
(2010) for a review of Australian banks’ liquidity conditions.   
3 New regulations for liquidity risk have also been approved and have already been introduced in some 
countries, such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand. 
5      
This paper focuses on the United States where the financial crisis has produced a large wave 
of bank defaults that appears still to be under way during the writing of this paper. This large 
number of defaults is driving a higher level of consolidation in the system and, possibly, 
other more profound structural changes. At the same time, it provides an interesting set for 
analysis and research in the sphere of bank distress. Not only does the large number of 
defaults represent a meaningful statistical set, but the degree and quality of the information 
available on funding for US banks also allow a more in-depth analysis than would be 
possible for many other countries.  
 
The contribution of this analysis is original in at least two respects. First, it is one of the very 
few studies investigating the recent wave of defaults of US banks, with particular focus on 
the role of funding. Second, in analysing banks’ deposits, it differentiates between different 
deposit features and, in particular, between insured and uninsured deposits.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a review of the literature on bank defaults 
and on the role of depositors in monitoring and disciplining banks’ behaviour. Section III 
provides the economic rationale for the empirical analysis presented in the following section. 
Section IV discusses the scope of the empirical analysis, the data, the econometric modelling, 
the results, and the robustness of the findings. Section V presents the conclusions. 
 
II.   THE LITERATURE  
Two strands of literature are of interest for the purpose of this work, one focusing on the 
analysis of bank failures and  the other looking at the market discipline role of depositors.  
 
A.   Literature on Defaults 
The empirical literature on bank defaults studies banking crises and the factors predicting 
failures by applying econometric and statistical techniques to identify the ex-post 
determinants of the event analysed, be it a systemic crisis or a financial institution distress. 
The methodologies most often used range from Logit or Probit regression models, to 
discriminant analysis, to hazard-function models.
4  
 
The analysis of the determinants of systemic crises is largely based on the assessment of the 
role of macroeconomic variables. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), among others, 
look at the determinants of banking crises in a number of countries between 1980 and 1994. 
They find that crises are more likely in countries with low GDP growth, high real interest 
rates, high inflation, higher likelihood of balance-of-payment crisis, and explicit deposit 
insurance. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) confirm the relevance of the latter 
element as a risk factor for the stability of banks.  
 
                                                 
4 Works based on hazard models, which also assess the timing of failure, are those by Lane et al. (1986), 
Whalen (1991), Cole and Gunter (1995), and Gonzales-Hermosillo (1999). 
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Particularly relevant to this work, however, is the literature on forecasting bank failure, 
distress and closure. These analyses are mainly focused on the early identification of 
institutions in financial difficulty, based on balance-sheet and profit-and-loss information, but 
also controlling for macroeconomic and other institutional factors. Studies in this area were 
developed in the 1970s.
5 Altman (1981) provides a comprehensive review of this early-stage 
literature. 
 
Demyanyk and Hasan (2009) provide an updated review of the literature on prediction 
methods for financial crises and bank failures. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) analyse the 
bank-specific factors that help to explain bank defaults in the United States during the period 
1984–1993. They find that banks with lower capitalization, lower profitability and poorer 
asset quality are more likely to fail than other banks. A proxy for bank liquidity appears in 
the model with a sign counter to ex ante expectation. Comparable results are found by 
Bongini et al. (2001) when analysing financial institutions’ distress during the Asian crisis of 
the late 1990s. 
 
Cole and Wu (2009) present a comparison between a dynamic hazard model and a Probit 
model as a bank failure early warning system, performing both in-sample and out-of-sample 
estimation using data on US banks from 1980 to 1992. They found that smaller banks with 
higher levels of non-performing loans and relying more on large certificates of deposit for 
their funding are more likely to fail. Larger banks with higher capital adequacy and 
profitability, and higher liquidity levels, are relatively safer. They also found that, while both 
models perform well, a hazard model seems to perform better than a Probit model in 
forecasting bank failures. A comparison of the performance of models predicting bank 
default is also provided by van der Ploeg (2010); using data for US banks between 1987 and 
2008, it shows that all the models considered (Logit, Probit, hazard, and neural networks) 
provide adequate and non-divergent performances. Cole and While (2010) analyse the 
determinants of the bank failures that occurred in the United States in 2009 and found that 
traditional proxies for the CAMEL components do a good job in explaining the failures of 
banks that closed in 2009, just as they did in the banking crisis of 1985–1992. 
 
B.   Literature on Deposits 
Deposits play a pivotal role in bank funding, as a major portion of a commercial bank’s 
assets is usually financed through customer deposits. The literature dealing with deposits and 
their role for banks is therefore also vast and well-developed. Among others, Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) argue that deposits are subject to bank runs and for this reason can be costly 
for banks because of their asset-liability maturity mismatches. Calomiris and Kahn (1991), 
Flannery (1994) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue, however, that demand deposits have 
positive effects on banks’ governance with a disciplining effect on bank managers. 
 
                                                 
5 Pifer (1970), Sinkey (1975), Altman (1977), Martin (1977) and Sinkey and Pettaway (1980). 
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When assessing the role of deposit insurance, most literature tends to maintain its distortional 
effect on depositors’ incentives to monitor banks.
6 Some studies argue, however, that, even 
when insured, depositors may still continue their monitoring of banks as they might not feel 
completely protected by the insurance scheme (Flannery 1998, and Cook and Spellman 
1994).  
 
The usefulness of short-term wholesale funding as a way of supplementing traditional retail 
deposits, particularly during the years preceding the global financial crisis, has been 
supported by most of the existing literature on the topic, pointing to the positive effects of 
wholesale funding. Calomiris (1999) finds that wholesale funding allows sophisticated 
investors to monitor banks effectively, provides market discipline, and lets banks exploit 
investment opportunities without being constrained by the deposit supply. The recent global 
financial crisis has, however, highlighted the limits of excessive reliance on short-term 
wholesale funding (Acharya et al. 2008, Huang and Ratnovski 2009 and Goldsmith-Pinkham 
and Yorulmazer 2010). Moreover, Huang and Ratnovski (2010) show that in an environment 
with a costless but noisy public signal on bank project quality, short-term wholesale 
financiers might have less incentives to conduct costly monitoring and may instead withdraw 
their funds based on negative public signals, triggering inefficient liquidations.  
 
The empirical evidence of the monitoring efforts of customer depositors and their 
disciplining effect on banks is not unidirectional. A number of works find that depositors 
have a disciplining effect on banks, particularly in the United States.
7 They include Goldberg 
and Hudgins (1996 and 2002), Park and Peristiani (1998), Billet et al. (1998), and Berger and 
Turk-Ariss (2011). Opposite findings, however, are reported by Gilbert and Vaughan (2001), 
Jordan et al. (1999) and Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001). It is interesting to note that most of the 
existing literature assesses the role of deposits without being able to distinguish between 
insured and uninsured, while the existing economic theory indicates that different behaviour 
by these two categories of deposits should be expected.  
 
III.   THE RATIONALE 
A fundamental argument for the need to regulate and supervise banks is the preservation of 
financial stability and, maybe more importantly, the protection of depositors, who own most 
of the banks’ debt (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). The need to protect depositors stems from 
the fact that banks, like many other financial and non-financial institutions, are subject to 
adverse selection and moral hazard. This would require investors and creditors, including 
depositors, to carry out close monitoring of banks. However, not all depositors are willing or 
skilled enough to exercise an adequate level of monitoring on banks’ conditions and 
                                                 
6 Bruche and Suarez (2010) argue that deposit insurance might also affect the functionality of the interbank 
money market. According to their analysis, in the presence of deposit insurance a rise in counterparty risk may 
in fact cause a freeze of interbank money markets. 
7 An analysis has also been conducted, however, on a few European (Poland, Russia and Switzerland) and Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) as well as for India, Japan and Jordan (see Berger 
and Turk-Ariss 2011 for a review).  
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riskiness. Smaller depositors in particular have little or no incentive at the individual level to 
monitor banks’ conditions. 
 
If the theory of different levels of monitoring by different banks’ creditors is correct, with 
depositors being less willing — and with fewer incentives — to monitor banks but more 
willing to rely on banking supervision and deposit insurance to look after them, it should also 
be true that depositors are more stable providers of funding to banks than other credits. 
 
Based on this argument, the first hypothesis assessed in this paper is the following:  
 
(i) The greater the reliance on non-deposit funding the higher, ceteris paribus, is 
banks’ vulnerability to default.  
 
The level of awareness of depositors and their stability should, however, vary amongst 
different kinds of depositors, also given the different levels of protection they enjoy, with 
only some benefiting from explicit insurance coverage.  
 
Hence, depositors with lower protection can be expected to behave somewhat differently 
from the more protected ones, particularly when the conditions of a bank start to deteriorate. 
Under these circumstances, the insured depositors would remain stable as they perceive no 
risk associated with maintaining their funds with the bank, while the less secure ones would 
take flight more easily. If this is true, then the composition of customer deposits would also 
matter for banks’ stability and therefore: 
 
(ii) The larger the share of less stable deposits, the higher is the banks’ probability of 
default, all other things being equal. 
 
More formally, hypotheses (i) and (ii) can be represented as follows: 
 
  k t i k t i j t i deposits y f Pd    , , , , ,   with    
0
, k t i deposits 
, 

















where Pdi,t is the probability of default of bank i at time t, depositsi,t-k is the level of customer 
deposits of bank i at time t-k, less stable depositsi,t-k is the share of less stable deposits out of 
the total customer deposits of bank i at time t-k, and yj,i,t-k is the control variable j for bank i at 
time t-k.  
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IV.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A.   Scope of the Analysis 
The empirical analysis aims to test the two hypotheses described in the previous section in 
the context of the US banking system. In particular, having shown funding fragility to be one 
of the main factors of fragility in the recent financial crisis (and in the distress of several 
large financial institutions), this work proposes a formal assessment of the role played by 
funding in the defaults of commercial banks that occurred in the United States between 2007 
and 2009. 
 
The role of funding is assessed using a statistical model that controls for variables which, 
according to the literature, have systematically been shown to explain bank defaults. These 
variables reflect both bank-specific conditions and macroeconomic and structural conditions. 
 
Hypothesis  (i) in particular is tested by looking at the composition of funding between 
customer deposits and other sources. If hypothesis (i) is correct, then the probability of a 
bank default should increase with less use of customer deposits funding. 
  
Once the role of deposits is assessed vis-à-vis other funding sources, the analysis moves to 
test hypothesis (ii). It investigates whether any specific form of customer deposit considered 
ex ante to be potentially more volatile than others has in fact been a significant driver of bank 
defaults.  
 
In particular, leveraging on the granularity of the information available for US banks on the 
composition of deposits at bank-by-bank level, the paper tests whether deposits above the 
level of coverage provided by the deposit insurance scheme are a meaningful indicator of the 
riskiness of a bank. It also tests for the demand versus time nature of these deposits.  
 
It then moves to test the role of brokered deposits. Brokered deposits were a source of 
significant risk during the savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s, growing rapidly ahead 
of the crisis, particularly among institutions that were later sold or liquidated by the 
authorities (Barth et al. 1990). A high probability of use of brokered deposits in the 1980s has 
been associated with low capital ratios and risky asset quality (Moore 1991). As a 
consequence, the US authorities introduced regulations to limit their use.
8 Investigating 
whether brokered deposits have had a role as a source of risk for banks in the most recent 
crisis as well allows an assessment to be made of the effectiveness of the policy response put 
in place at the time by the U.S. authorities.  
 
                                                 
8 Limits were introduced by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(FIRREA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). For further 
details see Davison (2000). 
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By testing the role of deposits as a driver of bank failure and, hence, as an indicator of banks’ 
riskiness, this analysis also allows some observations to be made regarding the market 
discipline and monitoring efforts of different kinds of depositors in the most recent crisis.  
 
B.   Data and Definitions 
For the purpose of the analysis it is necessary to define what a bank is and when a bank 
default occurs.  
 
  A bank is a regulated depository institution licensed in the United States and subject to 
the oversight within the country of one or more regulatory authorities and with its 
customer deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Other 
non-depository financial institutions such as investment banks, insurance companies, and 
brokers and hedge funds are therefore not included in the analysis.  
  A bank is in default when it is considered “failed” by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and listed as such on its website.
9 Under these circumstances, the 
liquidation of the bank, or its restructuring through purchase and assumption or similar 
transactions, usually occurs.  
On the basis of the above definitions, 168 banks failed in the United States between 2007 and 
2009. The number of failures registered increased dramatically in 2008 and then 2009, with 
defaults occurring well beyond the peak of the global financial crisis in 2007/2008 and 
continuing in significant numbers also in 2010 and 2011. Before 2007 very few or no 
defaults occurred for a number of years. 
 




















Default frequency (rhs, per cent)
Source: FDIC
 
The 168 bank failures between 2007 and 2009 are distributed among relatively larger banks 
compared with the universe of active banks in 2008 and 2009. All quartiles of the distribution 
of the defaulted banks are higher than those of the entire population of active banks. The 
                                                 
9 Failed banks are listed by the FDIC on its website at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. 
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statistics for the defaulted banks, referred to the year before default, are reported in Table 1 








Table 1. US bank failures 2007-2009: 
descriptive statistics (USD mn)
















For the purpose of the statistical analysis, a bank is considered defaulted in a given year t 
based on the information released by the FDIC, provided that a balance sheet referred to the 
previous year t-1 is available. On a few occasions, when defaults occurred at the beginning of 
the calendar year t  and the defaulting banks had not yet released their balance-sheet 
information for the period t-1, defaults were conventionally assigned to the previous calendar 
year t-1 so that a balance sheet existed one year before the default (i.e. at t-2).
10 
 
A paired sample of defaults and non-defaults was then selected for each given year from 
2007 to 2009. Non-defaulted banks were selected from the entire universe of active banks by 
matching their asset size and year with that of the defaulted banks. After this procedure, the 
average asset size of the two paired sub-samples should not be, by construction, significantly 
different from one another. This null hypothesis is tested and accepted, with a t-test for 
paired samples (Table 2).  
 
                                                 
10 Data on banks’ balance sheets, both for failed and active banks, has been provided by SNL Financial. 
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Sample
Average Asset Size 
at t-1 (USD mn)
Defaults 4,008
Non-defaults 4,847
One-tail t-test probability 16.15
Two-tails t-test probability 32.29
Table 2. Paired samples t-test: defaults and 
non-defaults  1/
1/ Non-sgnificance of the test statistic means that 
the null hypotesis of the two samples having the 
average is accepted.  
 
 
The estimation sample therefore includes 336 banks, of which 168 failed over the period 
2007–2009 and 168 were still going concerns at the end of the observation period (end-
2009). 
 
Using a matched sample is intuitively attractive compared with the use of the entire 
population, for which the estimates are affected by changes in the population characteristics 
and composition from one period to the next. By using a paired sample, the impact of these 
changes is avoided, reducing the volatility of the estimates. A low-default frequency potential 
problem is also addressed. However, the common sample has a reduced sample size and the 
sampling error can be partially offset by the reduced volatility on the matched sample 
estimates. More importantly, the sampling procedure does not ensure that the sample is 
representative of the population. This limitation can be overcome, however, by recalibrating 
the estimated model to the actual population, if need be, so that it can be used for forecasting 
purposes. In any case, this is not the immediate purpose of this work, for which the use of a 
paired sample appears desirable.  
 
C.   The Model 
A Logit model is used to analyse the role of funding in explaining bank defaults. Logit 
regression models are applied very frequently in the field of credit risk to estimate 
probabilities of default because they have the advantage of being able to deal with 
dichotomous response variables, taking 0–1 values.
11 
 
In this work, as in much of the literature on credit and default risk, the binary dependent 
variable Si,t is a variable representing the status of bank i at time t. When Si,t =1 a bank is in 
default and when Si,t =0 a bank is a going concern. 
 
                                                 
11 See Gujarati (1995) and Greene (2011) for a detailed description of the properties of Logit models.  
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As a first step in the model identification process, a base model of the likelihood of bank 
default is estimated. The model is based on a set of explanatory variables, which are 
intuitively related to the solvency conditions of a bank and which have consistently been 
shown in the existing literature to be significant predictors of banks’ likelihood of default. 
 
A combination of bank-specific balance sheets and profit-and-loss variables as well as 
macro-economic variables has been selected, so that a satisfactory explanatory power is 
achieved while keeping the model efficient and limiting the number of variables used. The 
selection of the set of explanatory variables is based on both a statistical and a graphical 
analysis, always verifying the economic meaningfulness of each variable in order to include 
only those that would be acceptable not just from a statistical but also from an economic 
standpoint ex ante, and would show the expected sign ex post.
12  
 
Hence, only statistically significant variables with the correct signs have been selected in an 
iterative approach aimed at maximizing the log likelihood function of the model. The final 
specification has been identified through a two-step procedure: first the univariate predictive 
power of each variable has been assessed, and then the optimal multivariate specification has 
been identified. The variables chosen represent banks’ profitability, asset quality and capital 
adequacy and the interest rates prevailing in the market.  
 
To address the non-existence of the explanatory variables for defaulted banks at time t, only 
lagged variables (with 1 to 4 lags) have been used in the process of model selection. The 
decision to use only lagged explanatory variables also limits the extent of any endogeneity 
issue in the model.  
 
As a result, the following multivariate Logit model has been identified and estimated: 
 
i t t t i t i t i t i Size PLR ROAE RBC NPL S                    1 6 2 5 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 , 2 1 ,   ( 1 ) 
 
with  Si,t  being the status of each bank i  at time t,  NPLi,t-1,  RBCi,t-1, ROAEi,t-1 being 
respectively the non-performing loans ratio, the risk-based capital ratio and the return on 
equity for bank i at time t-1, PLRt-2 being the level of the prime rate on short-term loans at 
time t-2 and Sizet-1 the natural logarithm of the banks’ asset size at t-1 (Table 3). 
 
The specification of the model described in equation (1) has been then amended to test for 
the hypothesis (i) and (ii) previously mentioned and, hence, to assess whether funding can be 
considered a meaningful indicator of banks’ risk conditions. In particular, variables 
representing bank funding conditions have been introduced. 
 
                                                 
12 The graphical analysis involves representing each variable on a scatter plot to see if there is an apparent 
separation of the values between the different statuses of default and non-default. However, this is not reported 
for parsimony.  
  14     
The first augmented model aims in particular to test hypothesis (i) by using the loan-to-
deposit ratio, LTDi,t, as explanatory variable, as specified by equation (2). This ratio provides 
a measure of the funding mix chosen by a bank to finance its loan portfolio. The higher the 
LTD ratio the less the bank is using customer deposits to finance its loan portfolio.  
 
i t i t t i t i t i t i t i LTD Size PLR ROAE RBC NPL S                       3 , 7 1 6 2 , 5 1 , 4 1 , 3 1 . 2 1 ,   ( 2 ) 
 
If hypothesis (i) is correct, then a higher loan-to-deposit ratio should be positively related to 
banks’ riskiness and probability of default. It implies, in fact, that a larger share of bank 
assets is financed with forms of funding intrinsically more volatile than deposits.  
 
Once the role of the composition of funding between deposits and non-deposits has been 
considered, an investigation of the role of different forms of deposits Di,k,t (with k being the 
different subset of deposits) is carried out to test hypothesis (ii). The alternative model 
specifications look at those deposits which, ex ante, can be considered potentially more 
volatile.  
 
In particular, deposits that can be considered ex ante potentially less stable are those 
exceeding the level of coverage provided by the FDIC.
13 Brokered deposits are also assessed 
for the role they played in the S&L crisis. The time and non-time nature of deposits has been 
analysed as well. The variables used in the model are therefore the following: 
 
-  Brokered deposits to total deposits 
-  Deposits over $100,000 (or $250,000) to total deposits  
-  Time deposits over $100,000 to total deposits 
-  Non-time deposits over $100,000 to total deposits 
-  Non-time deposits to total deposits 
 
The equation including the deposit variables listed above is the following. 
 




                                                 
13 The threshold used is $100,000 in line with the maximum coverage provided by the FDIC before the crisis. 
The limit, however, has been temporarily increased to $250,000 as of 3 October 2008 (Our usage and it avoids 
too many commas). On 20 May 2009, the temporary measure was extended to the end of 2013. On 21 July 
2010, the approval of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act permanently raised the 
maximum coverage to $250,000 (FDIC 2010a). On 9 November 2010, the FDIC issued a Final Rule 
implementing Section 343 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that provides 
for unlimited insurance coverage of non-interest-bearing transaction accounts (FDIC 2010b). 
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D.   Results 
The basic results confirm the findings of the literature on bank defaults, which show clear 
evidence of the relationship between probability of default and capital adequacy, profitability 
and asset quality. These variables are all very significant in explaining bank defaults in the 
United States between 2007 and 2009 (Table 4).  
Looking at the role of funding, the results also indicate clearly that funding played a key role 
in determining banks’ default risk. A weaker deposit base negatively affects the likelihood of 
bank failure. In particular, both the level and the composition of deposit funding appear to 
matter.  
 
It is found that both the extent to which a bank is funding its asset through deposits (rather 
than other forms) and the intrinsic stability of the deposit base play a key role in explaining 
bank default. Both these dimensions are relevant for the sample analysed, after controlling 
for bank-specific variables (profitability, capitalization, asset quality and size) and macro-
economic variables. 
 
In particular, a higher level of the loan-to-deposit ratio or, in other words, a heavier reliance 
by banks on alternative forms of funding to deposits, significantly increases banks’ 
probability of default.
14 Defaults are more likely not only immediately after a higher level of 
the loan-to-deposit ratio is observed but also two to three years after such an increase. This 
implies that banks need to achieve a balanced funding position in a structural and stable 
manner, since temporary improvements in the funding profile (or temporary weakening) are 
not likely to affect banks’ stability in a significant way (Table 5). 
 
Not all deposits, however, contribute equally to banks’ funding stability. Although results are 
subject to some uncertainties, they seem to suggest clearly that different types of deposits 
have different effects on banks’ likelihood of default, with the reliance on more volatile 
sources of deposits appearing to be a significant risk factor. 
 
Deposits above the level of coverage provided by the deposit insurance scheme contribute, 
however, to explaining bank defaults in a specific way. While there is no apparent effect of 
the stock of deposits above the level of deposit insurance, there is still some indication that 
higher reliance on deposits above the level of coverage might imply a higher probability of 
default. In particular, deposits above the level of coverage and with time-nature appear to be 
correlated to the default risk (Table 6). This finding might indicate that when a bank’s 
conditions tend to deteriorate, the bank’s managers increase their preference for large time-
deposits, possibly in the knowledge that their time feature will make them inherently more 
stable than large demand deposits if the bank’s conditions worsen. 
 
                                                 
14 Merrouche and Nier (2010) provide empirical evidence of the possible reasons behind the build-up of 
financial imbalances (as measured by the loan-to-deposit ratio) in OECD countries ahead of the global financial 
crisis. 
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Hardly anything can be said, however, for the entire stock of deposits above the level of 
coverage which, in this analysis, is non-significant in explaining bank default. There is in fact 
no clear evidence of more stringent bank monitoring by uninsured depositors that one would 
expect ex ante. However, the variable representing large demand deposits, although non-
significant, shows a negative sign, suggesting some consistency with the hypothesis of more 
active monitoring by large demand depositors. 
 
Brokered deposits are still a significant variable in explaining bank defaults, despite the 
regulatory limitations introduced after the S&L crisis. Higher levels of brokered deposits are 
in fact significantly associated with higher default probabilities. Such a relation appears to be 
stable and persistent, provided that the significance of this variable is observed from one to 
three periods before default. Hence, it can be argued that the more persistently problematic 
institutions tend to rely more than sound institutions on such a form of funding without being 
able to achieve any improvement in their funding conditions, but rather further increase their 
default risk. The effectiveness of the regulations introduced after the S&L crisis appears 
questionable. 
 
Overall, banks’ management actions seem to signal weak conditions better than depositors’ 
monitoring efforts. With the variables approximating the latter not being significant, the 
variables most likely to reflect banks’ managerial actions, such as time-deposits and brokered 
deposits, show a much clearer relationship with the banks’ probability of default.  
 
However, in either case it is evident that the banks’ funding choices do affect their 
probability of default and clearly indicate deteriorating conditions well ahead of the actual 
failure. 18
 
    
 















*** Shows significance at 1 per cent.
Lending Ratet-2
Constant


















average prime rate on short-term loans to business
loan-to-deposit ratio
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FDIC, SNL Financials, US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
deposits above $ 100.000 to total deposits
1/ A bank is considered to be in default when US authorities intervene and it is included in the 
list of failed banks by the FDIC.
non-time deposits to total deposits
natural logarithm of the bank's total asset size
brokered deposits to total deposits 
Time deposits above $ 100.000 to total deposits 
non time-deposits above $ 100.000 to total deposits 
return on average equity
Table 3. Definition of variables used in the main model 
Definition

































McFadden R-squared 0.669 0.709 0.709
Log likelihood -77.00 -67.69 -67.17
1/ Dependent variable is bank status (default/non-default).




















    McFadden R-squared 0.684 0.682 0.672 0.678 0.676 0.663 0.665 0.668 0.664
Log likelihood -73.61 -74.03 -75.63 -74.71 -73.47 -66.59 -77.93 -77.43 -78.15
1/ Dependent variable is bank status (default/non-default).
*, **, *** Show significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively.
IX
Table 6. Bank defaults. Does deposit composition matter? Looking at size, contractual maturity (demand vs time ), and brokered 1/
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
195.427 182.051 185.400 167.756 149.028 148.922 193.524 187.291 194.068
(50.358) (49.817) (50.159) (50.325) (53.645) (52.834) (48.326) (49.197) (48.460)
35.563 34.476 35.202 37.464 33.301 29.03 36.426 35.086 35.726
(7.630)*** (7.567)*** (7.484)*** (7.813)*** (7.792)*** (7.702)*** (7.519)*** (7.396)*** (7.357)***
-39.705 -40.574 -39.984 -43.678 -45.257 -43.704 -45.835 -44.477 -45.717
(9.673)*** (9.595)*** (9.686)*** (9.843)*** (10.805)*** (12.141)*** (9.837)*** (9.699)*** (9.912)***
-4.122 -4.209 -4.085 -4.044 -4.054 -3.579 -4.081 -4.071 -4.086
(1.040)*** (1.053)*** (1.051)*** (1.034)*** (1.031)*** (1.201)*** (1.045)*** (1.023)*** (1.038)***
-2394.988 -2222.935 -2263.046 -2059.617 -1803.660 -1797.489 -2357.988 -2280.533 -2362.963
(620.412)*** (613.178)*** (617.108)*** (619.162)*** (660.756)*** (652.023)*** (594.765)*** (605.0989)*** (595.816)***
-0.084 -0.100 -0.103 -0.036 -0.142 -0.187 -0.099 -0.050 -0.083



















All Large Deposits t-1





Large Time Deposits t-1
Large Time Deposits t-2







E.   Robustness 
The Logit model presented above has been tested for robustness to the use of an alternative set of 
explanatory variables. First, a number of macroeconomic variables have been tested in 
alternative specifications of the model by replacing the lending rate previously used (the average 
prime rate on short-term loans to business) with the GDP growth rate, the unemployment rate, 
the consumer price index and an alternative measure of the lending rate (the conventional 
mortgage rate) (Table 7). 
 
The unemployment rate and the alternative lending rate are shown to be significant and their 
introduction confirms the general findings of the main model specification presented above. 
GDP growth rate and CPI are also significant, but the former presents a sign that is not consistent 
with the economic rationale, while the interpretation of the latter is not immediate due to the 
unclear ex ante relationship between CPI and banks’ probability of default. Even in these cases, 
however, the funding variables remain highly significant, confirming the robustness of the 
estimates (Table 8).  
 
The robustness of the results concerning the sensitivity of the banks’ probability of default to 
their funding conditions is also confirmed when using a different set of bank-specific variables to 
represent capital adequacy, profitability and asset quality. In practice, the tangible common 
equity ratio, net income before taxes to total assets, and provisions to total assets are now used 
instead of the risk-based capital ratio, the return on average equity and the non-performing loans 
ratio (Table 7). The results show that in all cases there is no loss of significance of the funding 
variables (Table 9).  
 
This is also confirmed when jointly substituting the banks’ specific variables and the 
macroeconomic variable. In this last specification of the alternative model, all but one (bank 
size) of the control variables have been replaced from the original model and all three significant 
funding variables still retain, and even improve, their level of significance (Table 9). The 
difference here is that with the alternatively specified set of bank-specific variables the bank size 
variable, which was previously never significant, now becomes somewhat significant. 
 
The results are also robust to the use of alternative specifications of the banks’ funding mix. 
While in the main model the LTD ratio has been used as the best performing proxy for funding 
composition, alternative variables could also have been used to measure the bank funding mix. 
To verify the robustness of results to this choice a commonly used alternative to the LTD ratio, 
the assets-to-deposits ratio, has also been tested. Results show that the assets-to-deposits ratio is 
as significant as the LTD ratio in explaining banking crises (Table 10).  
 











GDP Growth Rate, Real (Percentage Change)
CPI-U  Non-Seasonally Adjusted
Definition
Provisions to Total Assets 
Tangible Common Equity Ratio
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, SNL Financials, US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Unemployment Rate Seasonally Adjusted
Table 7. Definition of bank-specific and macroeconomic variables used in the 
alternative models 
Net Income Before Taxes to Total Assets








25.803 28.927 25.305 -13.904 -14.720 -13.342 0.677 1.650 1.122 0.773 1.803 1.220
(7.259) (6.964) (7.009) (4.122) (3.956) (3.929) (1.951) (1.885) (1.991) (1.949) (1.897) (1.999)
39.770 35.580 37.683 39.996 36.090 38.081 39.972 35.964 38.011 39.221 34.775 36.920
(8.104)*** (7.512)*** (7.760)*** (8.056)*** (7.554)*** (7.742)*** (8.117)*** (7.570)*** (7.800)*** (8.027)*** (7.376)*** (7.634)***
-50.537 -36.519 -39.978 -49.939 -36.068 -39.936 -50.480 -36.598 -40.135 -50.319 -36.031 -39.459
(9.915)*** (9.078)*** (9.199)*** (9.825)*** (9.204)*** (9.288)*** (9.906)*** (9.143)*** (9.261)*** (9.878)*** (8.956)*** (9.069)***
-4.284 -3.812 -3.701 -4.261 -3.854 -3.745 -4.309 -3.869 -3.746 -4.192 -3.682 -3.595
(1.037)*** (0.997)*** (0.990)*** (1.032)*** (1.005)*** (0.996)*** (1.040)*** (1.005)*** (0.996)*** (1.027)*** (0.979)*** (0.979)***
-0.177 -0.067 -0.026 -0.185 -0.089 -0.045 -0.079 -0.037 -0.159 -0.044 -0.006





120.945^ 133.871 ^ 118.285 ^
(31.917)*** (30.963)*** (30.643)***
52.035 ^ 54.823 ^ 48.758 ^
(14.332)*** (13.639)*** (13.719)***
4.618 4.580 4.585 4.696
(1.061)*** (1.049)*** (1.057)*** (1.066)***
4.275 4.483 4.352 4.171
(1.496)*** (1.510)*** (1.505)*** (1.481)***
Large Time Deposits t-1 4.767 4.957 4.782 4.815
(2.006)** (1.975)** (1.998)** (2.010)**
McFadden R-squared 0.694 0.665 0.658 0.692 0.659 0.659 0.695 0.667 0.660 0.692 0.660 0.654
Log likelihood -71.21 -78.01 -79.38 -71.64 -79.15 -79.16 -71.11 -77.59 -79.05 -71.81 -79.15 -80.31
1/ Dependent variable is bank status (default/non-default).
*, **, *** Show significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively.
^ Indicates that the sign is either not the expected one or its interpretation is not univocal.
I d
Table 8. Bank defaults and funding relevance. Testing for robustness to alternative macroeconomic variables 1/



















240.970 260.263 234.210 -12.487 -13.227 -12.656
(55.013) (57.914) (55.357) (4.276) (4.325) (4.161)
-1.147 -1.038 -1.201 -1.233 -1.183 -1.339
(0.376)*** (0.385)*** (0.383)*** (0.370)*** (0.399)*** (0.391)***
-72.493 -63.215 -66.283 -70.635 -60.386 -64.505
(12.116)*** (11.287)*** (11.415)*** (11.944)*** (11.032)*** (11.203)***
-44.558 -43.112 -40.968 -43.451 -41.482 -39.801
(8.752)*** (8.457)*** (8.301)*** (8.617)*** (8.311)*** (8.197)***
-0.386 -0.299 -0.228 -0.382 -0.295 -0.223









Large Time Deposits t-1 6.155 6.243
(2.006)*** (2.223)***
McFadden R-squared 0.633 0.623 0.608 0.623 0.613 0.600
Log likelihood -82.35 -84.57 -87.66 -84.49 -86.84 -89.53
1/ Dependent variable is bank status (default/non-default).
*, **, *** Show significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent respectively.
I b II b
Constant
I a II a III a III b
LTD t-2
Brokered Deposits t-1
Table 9. Bank defaults and funding relevance. Testing for robustness to alternative bank-specific variables 
1/





Adequacy Ratio  t-1



















































1/ Dependent variable is bank status (default/non-default).
*** Shows significance at 1 per cent.




Table 10. Testing for robustness of results to an alternative 







V.   CONCLUSIONS 
The experience of the latest financial crisis has shown how crucial liquidity conditions can be for 
banks’ operations under stress and their likelihood of survival. For medium and large banks in 
particular, critical liquidity conditions can spill over to other parts of the financial system, with 
negative consequences on stability. The evidence of this paper confirms that funding liquidity 
conditions significantly affect banks’ risk profile and, ultimately, their likelihood of default.  
 
The empirical evidence for US banks therefore provides clear support for more careful regulation 
and supervision of banks’ liquidity conditions by the supervisory and regulatory authorities. 
While this paper focuses on US banks only, the policy recommendation of tighter regulation and 
supervision of liquidity conditions can arguably be extended to a large number of countries.  
 
The evidence of the relationship between banks’ funding profiles and their risk of default can be 
related to the new regulatory framework for liquidity risk adopted by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2010). While the main purpose of the paper is neither to assess the new 
framework nor to discuss the optimal design of liquidity regulation, it is possible, however, to 
note that the new rules appear to have the potential and the features to help reduce the likelihood 
of banks’ experiencing liquidity weaknesses.
16 In particular, by differentiating the treatment for 
the more stable and the less-stable deposits in the context of both the liquidity coverage ratio and 
the net stable funding ratio, the regulatory framework correctly recognizes the different impacts 
that different deposits can have on banks’ stability. Nevertheless, the implementation of the new 
measures will be of great importance, as supervisory authorities will be called upon to identify 
those deposits that are more likely to have a destabilizing effect on banks. 
 
It will be also important that the new regulation be applied extensively within and across banking 
systems. The findings of this analysis in fact suggest that it is advisable not to limit the 
application of the new liquidity regulations only to internationally active banks, but rather to 
extend their application also to medium- and small-sized institutions, whose survival too can be 
critically affected by a weak liquidity and funding profile.  
 
The US authorities might also wish to reconsider the existing regulation on the use of brokered 
deposits, which does not appear to have been effective enough in reducing their abuse, as this 
remains a critical factor in explaining defaults of US banks. 
 
Finally, while the introduction of prudential regulation on liquidity appears important, it is also 
essential for this to be combined with reinforced supervisory focus on the specific risk area, 
which was almost completely neglected by supervisory authorities worldwide ahead of the crisis. 
 
                                                 
16 Perotti and Suarez (2011) analyse the design of liquidity regulation and suggest that an optimal policy should 
involve both price and quantity rules. 
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